Andrei Matei (2): bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access bpf: Guard stack limits against 32bit overflow
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 20 +++++++------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
From: Andrei Matei andreimatei1@gmail.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit afea95d319ccb4ad2060dece9ac5e2e364dec543 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9EW CVE: CVE-2023-52676
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit a833a17aeac73b33f79433d7cee68d5cafd71e4f ]
This patch fixes a bug around the verification of possibly-zero-sized stack accesses. When the access was done through a var-offset stack pointer, check_stack_access_within_bounds was incorrectly computing the maximum-offset of a zero-sized read to be the same as the register's min offset. Instead, we have to take in account the register's maximum possible value. The patch also simplifies how the max offset is checked; the check is now simpler than for min offset.
The bug was allowing accesses to erroneously pass the check_stack_access_within_bounds() checks, only to later crash in check_stack_range_initialized() when all the possibly-affected stack slots are iterated (this time with a correct max offset). check_stack_range_initialized() is relying on check_stack_access_within_bounds() for its accesses to the stack-tracking vector to be within bounds; in the case of zero-sized accesses, we were essentially only verifying that the lowest possible slot was within bounds. We would crash when the max-offset of the stack pointer was >= 0 (which shouldn't pass verification, and hopefully is not something anyone's code attempts to do in practice).
Thanks Hao for reporting!
Fixes: 01f810ace9ed3 ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access") Reported-by: Hao Sun sunhao.th@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei andreimatei1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman eddyz87@gmail.com Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231207041150.229139-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsZGEUaRCHsmaX=h-efVogsRfK1FPxmkgb0Os_frnHi... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2641ad3c1e08..f5d173fd2005 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3780,10 +3780,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; - if (access_size > 0) - max_off = min_off + access_size - 1; - else - max_off = min_off; + max_off = min_off + access_size; } else { if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->smin_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) { @@ -3792,15 +3789,12 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( return -EACCES; } min_off = reg->smin_value + off; - if (access_size > 0) - max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size - 1; - else - max_off = min_off; + max_off = reg->smax_value + off + access_size; }
err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(min_off, state, type); - if (!err) - err = check_stack_slot_within_bounds(max_off, state, type); + if (!err && max_off > 0) + err = -EINVAL; /* out of stack access into non-negative offsets */
if (err) { if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
From: Andrei Matei andreimatei1@gmail.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 1d38a9ee81570c4bd61f557832dead4d6f816760 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9EW CVE: CVE-2023-52676
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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This patch promotes the arithmetic around checking stack bounds to be done in the 64-bit domain, instead of the current 32bit. The arithmetic implies adding together a 64-bit register with a int offset. The register was checked to be below 1<<29 when it was variable, but not when it was fixed. The offset either comes from an instruction (in which case it is 16 bit), from another register (in which case the caller checked it to be below 1<<29 [1]), or from the size of an argument to a kfunc (in which case it can be a u32 [2]). Between the register being inconsistently checked to be below 1<<29, and the offset being up to an u32, it appears that we were open to overflowing the `int`s which were currently used for arithmetic.
[1] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe... [2] https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/815fb87b753055df2d9e50f6cd80eb10235fe...
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei andreimatei1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231207041150.229139-4-andreimatei1@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f5d173fd2005..d0f01f0535f7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3737,7 +3737,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, * The minimum valid offset is -MAX_BPF_STACK for writes, and * -state->allocated_stack for reads. */ -static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(int off, +static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(s64 off, struct bpf_func_state *state, enum bpf_access_type t) { @@ -3766,7 +3766,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env); struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno; struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg); - int min_off, max_off; + s64 min_off, max_off; int err; char *err_extra;
@@ -3779,7 +3779,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds( err_extra = " write to";
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) { - min_off = reg->var_off.value + off; + min_off = (s64)reg->var_off.value + off; max_off = min_off + access_size; } else { if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
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