From: Daniel Vacek neelx@redhat.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.211 commit 3f38d22e645e2e994979426ea5a35186102ff3c2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2Y3 CVE: CVE-2024-26766
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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commit e6f57c6881916df39db7d95981a8ad2b9c3458d6 upstream.
Unfortunately the commit `fd8958efe877` introduced another error causing the `descs` array to overflow. This reults in further crashes easily reproducible by `sendmsg` system call.
[ 1080.836473] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x400300015528b00a: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1080.869326] RIP: 0010:hfi1_ipoib_build_ib_tx_headers.constprop.0+0xe1/0x2b0 [hfi1] -- [ 1080.974535] Call Trace: [ 1080.976990] <TASK> [ 1081.021929] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_common+0x7a/0x2e0 [hfi1] [ 1081.027364] hfi1_ipoib_send_dma_list+0x62/0x270 [hfi1] [ 1081.032633] hfi1_ipoib_send+0x112/0x300 [hfi1] [ 1081.042001] ipoib_start_xmit+0x2a9/0x2d0 [ib_ipoib] [ 1081.046978] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc4/0x210 -- [ 1081.148347] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0
crash> ipoib_txreq 0xffff9cfeba229f00 struct ipoib_txreq { txreq = { list = { next = 0xffff9cfeba229f00, prev = 0xffff9cfeba229f00 }, descp = 0xffff9cfeba229f40, coalesce_buf = 0x0, wait = 0xffff9cfea4e69a48, complete = 0xffffffffc0fe0760 <hfi1_ipoib_sdma_complete>, packet_len = 0x46d, tlen = 0x0, num_desc = 0x0, desc_limit = 0x6, next_descq_idx = 0x45c, coalesce_idx = 0x0, flags = 0x0, descs = {{ qw = {0x8024000120dffb00, 0x4} # SDMA_DESC0_FIRST_DESC_FLAG (bit 63) }, { qw = { 0x3800014231b108, 0x4} }, { qw = { 0x310000e4ee0fcf0, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x3000012e9f8000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x59000dfb9d0000, 0x8} }, { qw = { 0x78000e02e40000, 0x8} }} }, sdma_hdr = 0x400300015528b000, <<< invalid pointer in the tx request structure sdma_status = 0x0, SDMA_DESC0_LAST_DESC_FLAG (bit 62) complete = 0x0, priv = 0x0, txq = 0xffff9cfea4e69880, skb = 0xffff9d099809f400 }
If an SDMA send consists of exactly 6 descriptors and requires dword padding (in the 7th descriptor), the sdma_txreq descriptor array is not properly expanded and the packet will overflow into the container structure. This results in a panic when the send completion runs. The exact panic varies depending on what elements of the container structure get corrupted. The fix is to use the correct expression in _pad_sdma_tx_descs() to test the need to expand the descriptor array.
With this patch the crashes are no longer reproducible and the machine is stable.
Fixes: fd8958efe877 ("IB/hfi1: Fix sdma.h tx->num_descs off-by-one errors") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Mats Kronberg kronberg@nsc.liu.se Tested-by: Mats Kronberg kronberg@nsc.liu.se Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek neelx@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201081009.1109442-1-neelx@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com --- drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c index 2dc97de434a5..68a8557e9a7c 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/sdma.c @@ -3200,7 +3200,7 @@ int _pad_sdma_tx_descs(struct hfi1_devdata *dd, struct sdma_txreq *tx) { int rval = 0;
- if ((unlikely(tx->num_desc + 1 == tx->desc_limit))) { + if ((unlikely(tx->num_desc == tx->desc_limit))) { rval = _extend_sdma_tx_descs(dd, tx); if (rval) { __sdma_txclean(dd, tx);
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