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[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G
by Xia Fukun 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 8fe0231adebe086c8a459c790944ac026cd99c6e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15827 CVE: CVE-2026-53133 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 15fe76e23615f502d051ef0768f86babaf08746c ] When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single block that is very large split across multiple SG entries. When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses for blocks after the truncation. Use the right types to hold DMA addresses. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/1-v1-88303e9e509f+f7-ib_umem_types_jgg@nvidia.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a808273a495c ("RDMA/verbs: Add a DMA iterator to return aligned contiguous memory blocks") Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c [Newer versions moved this function to iter.c, this version adapts the changes in verbs.c.] Signed-off-by: Xia Fukun <xiafukun(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c index d7eb65988a46..7082fc7899a8 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c @@ -3025,8 +3025,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__rdma_block_iter_start); bool __rdma_block_iter_next(struct ib_block_iter *biter) { - unsigned int block_offset; - unsigned int delta; + dma_addr_t block_offset; + dma_addr_t delta; if (!biter->__sg_nents || !biter->__sg) return false; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[patch OLK-6.6] selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs
by Cai Xinchen 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc4 commit 9fe595fad54d4ac6a402edb3f60bec859d52cea6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitcode.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9112 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable memory mapping in general. The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the mounter credentials would be incorrect. Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and determine it based on the boolean and the file struct. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2d9f365022cb..b3d93234a4c3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3794,9 +3794,9 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; -static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, - const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, - bool shared, bool bf_user_file) +static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool mounter_check, + bool bf_user_file) { struct inode *inode = NULL; bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC; @@ -3809,10 +3809,10 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, inode = file_inode(file); } - if (default_noexec && prot_exec && + if (!mounter_check && default_noexec && prot_exec && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) { int rc; - u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); + u32 sid = current_sid(); /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private @@ -3825,6 +3825,8 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, } if (file) { + const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ? + file->f_cred : current_cred(); /* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */ u32 av = FILE__READ; if (shared && prot_write) @@ -3838,11 +3840,11 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, return 0; } -static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, - const struct file *file, - unsigned long prot, bool shared) +static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, + unsigned long prot, bool shared, + bool mounter_check) { - return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false); + return __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check, false); } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) @@ -3858,12 +3860,14 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) return rc; } -static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, - unsigned long prot, bool shared) +static int selinux_mmap_file_common(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool mounter_check) { if (file) { int rc; struct common_audit_data ad; + const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ? + file->f_cred : current_cred(); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; @@ -3872,15 +3876,16 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, return rc; } - return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared); + return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check); } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot, - (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); + return selinux_mmap_file_common(file, prot, + (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED, + false); } /** @@ -3912,8 +3917,9 @@ static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) prot |= PROT_EXEC; - return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file, - prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED); + return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file, prot, + vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED, + true); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -3974,11 +3980,11 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } } - rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file); + rc = __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, false, backing_file); if (rc) return rc; if (backing_file) { - rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared); + rc = file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, true); if (rc) return rc; } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized
by Pu Lehui 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc2 commit a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16515 CVE: CVE-2026-64192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However, if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for the BPF LSM. Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset (bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes or more). When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering an immediate kernel panic. Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init() when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning -EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized. This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent, avoiding zombie map states. Fixes: 8ea636848aca ("bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes") Reported-by: oxsignal <awo(a)kakao.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil(a)etsalapatis.com> Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260628201103.3624525-1-mattbobrowski@google.c… Conflicts: include/linux/bpf_lsm.h kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c security/bpf/hooks.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 4 ++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c | 10 ++++++++++ security/bpf/hooks.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h index 272655378f94..4947fc758de8 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM +extern bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init; + #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__); #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> @@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_retval_range *range); #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ +#define bpf_lsm_initialized false + static inline int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog, const struct bpf_prog *prog) { diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c index a4ac48c7dada..4fd82425feba 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c @@ -223,6 +223,16 @@ static struct bpf_map *inode_storage_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) { struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap; + /* + * Do not allow allocation of BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE if the BPF LSM + * was not initialized by the LSM framework at boot. Without proper + * initialization, the BPF inode security blob offset remains unprepared, + * causing bpf_inode() to calculate an invalid memory offset and corrupt + * inode->i_security. + */ + if (!bpf_lsm_initialized) + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + smap = bpf_local_storage_map_alloc(attr); if (IS_ERR(smap)) return ERR_CAST(smap); diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c index 788667d582ae..bdda0ca174a9 100644 --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> +bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init + static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME), @@ -17,6 +19,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void) { security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf"); + bpf_lsm_initialized = true; pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n"); return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized
by Pu Lehui 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc2 commit a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16515 CVE: CVE-2026-64192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However, if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for the BPF LSM. Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset (bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes or more). When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering an immediate kernel panic. Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init() when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning -EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized. This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent, avoiding zombie map states. Fixes: 8ea636848aca ("bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes") Reported-by: oxsignal <awo(a)kakao.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil(a)etsalapatis.com> Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260628201103.3624525-1-mattbobrowski@google.c… Conflicts: include/linux/bpf_lsm.h kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c security/bpf/hooks.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 4 ++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c | 9 +++++++++ security/bpf/hooks.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h index aefcd6564251..625f4926da53 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM +extern bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init; + #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__); #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> @@ -50,6 +52,8 @@ int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_retval_range *range); #else /* !CONFIG_BPF_LSM */ +#define bpf_lsm_initialized false + static inline bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id) { return false; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c index 44e8082b88dd..d18bee3eb990 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c @@ -189,6 +189,15 @@ static int notsupp_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, static struct bpf_map *inode_storage_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) { + /* + * Do not allow allocation of BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE if the BPF LSM + * was not initialized by the LSM framework at boot. Without proper + * initialization, the BPF inode security blob offset remains unprepared, + * causing bpf_inode() to calculate an invalid memory offset and corrupt + * inode->i_security. + */ + if (!bpf_lsm_initialized) + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); return bpf_local_storage_map_alloc(attr, &inode_cache, false); } diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c index 35933ae53b92..2e9c247c3a63 100644 --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> +bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init; + static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME), @@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void) { security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf"); + bpf_lsm_initialized = true; pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n"); return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
by Zeng Heng 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit 0861615c28de668669d748ef4eb913ea9262d13b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15932 CVE: CVE-2026-53246 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params(). However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE processing and kmemdup() copies). Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO buffer before it is used. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/eb60825fa22d6f9e663c7d4dbb69f397b5d34d42.178036236… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c [ Context conflict ] Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 35e1fb708f4a..9ccc1d88b1ca 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1720,6 +1720,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie; struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb; struct sctp_cookie *bear_cookie; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch; __u8 *digest = ep->digest; enum sctp_scope scope; unsigned int len; @@ -1750,6 +1751,10 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( cookie = chunk->subh.cookie_hdr; bear_cookie = &cookie->c; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)(bear_cookie + 1); + if (ntohs(ch->length) > len - fixed_size) + goto malformed; + if (!sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac) goto no_hmac; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning
by Luo Gengkun 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.142 commit add70e2682c0ad3be2a5810bcf1bc13963ba4df9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16356 CVE: CVE-2026-64113 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- commit 5d49b568c188dc77199d8d2b959c91da8cc27cf1 upstream. ixgbevf_clean_rx_irq() prunes frames whose source MAC matches the VF's own address (VEPA multicast workaround) by freeing the skb and continuing to the next descriptor: dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); continue; The skb pointer is declared outside the while loop and persists across iterations. Because the continue skips the "skb = NULL" reset at the bottom of the loop, the next iteration enters the "else if (skb)" path and calls ixgbevf_add_rx_frag() on the freed skb, dereferencing skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags - a use-after-free in NAPI softirq context. The sibling driver iavf already handles this correctly by nulling the pointer before continuing. Apply the same pattern here. I do not have ixgbevf hardware; the bug was found by static analysis (scan_drop_continue_loops.py + semgrep drop_continue_in_loop, multi-tool corroboration with the highest score in the scan). The UAF was confirmed under KASAN by loading a test module that reproduces the exact code pattern (alloc skb, kfree_skb, then read skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ixgbevf_uaf_test_init+0x100/0x1000 Read of size 8 at addr 000000006163ae78 by task insmod/30 freed 208-byte region [000000006163adc0, 000000006163ae90) QEMU emulates igb (82576) but not ixgbe (82599), and the igbvf VF driver does not include the VEPA source pruning path, so a full end-to-end reproduction with emulated hardware was not possible. Fixes: bad17234ba70 ("ixgbevf: Change receive model to use double buffered page based receives") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515182419.1597859-8-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c index e2631c1ae272..9b7cef2bd56d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbevf/ixgbevf_main.c @@ -1223,6 +1223,7 @@ static int ixgbevf_clean_rx_irq(struct ixgbevf_q_vector *q_vector, ether_addr_equal(rx_ring->netdev->dev_addr, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source)) { dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); + skb = NULL; continue; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] gcov: use atomic counter updates to fix concurrent access crashes
by Luo Gengkun 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko(a)virtuozzo.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 56cb9b7d96b28a1173a510ab25354b6599ad3a33 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16154 CVE: CVE-2026-63825 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- GCC's GCOV instrumentation can merge global branch counters with loop induction variables as an optimization. In inflate_fast(), the inner copy loops get transformed so that the GCOV counter value is loaded multiple times to compute the loop base address, start index, and end bound. Since GCOV counters are global (not per-CPU), concurrent execution on different CPUs causes the counter to change between loads, producing inconsistent values and out-of-bounds memory writes. The crash manifests during IPComp (IP Payload Compression) processing when inflate_fast() runs concurrently on multiple CPUs: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd0a3c0902ffa RIP: inflate_fast+1431 Call Trace: zlib_inflate __deflate_decompress crypto_comp_decompress ipcomp_decompress [xfrm_ipcomp] ipcomp_input [xfrm_ipcomp] xfrm_input At the crash point, the compiler generated three loads from the same global GCOV counter (__gcov0.inflate_fast+216) to compute base, start, and end for an indexed loop. Another CPU modified the counter between loads, making the values inconsistent - the write went 3.4 MB past a 65 KB buffer. Add -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic to CFLAGS_GCOV at the global level in the top-level Makefile, guarded by a try-run compile test. The test compiles a minimal program with and without -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic using the full KBUILD_CFLAGS, then compares undefined symbols in the resulting object files. If prefer-atomic introduces new undefined references (such as __atomic_fetch_add_8 on i386 or __aarch64_ldadd8_relax on arm64 with outline-atomics), the flag is not added -- the kernel does not link against libatomic. On architectures where GCC inlines 64-bit atomic counter updates (x86_64, s390, ...) the test passes and the flag is enabled, preventing the compiler from merging counters with loop induction variables and fixing the observed concurrent-access crash. On architectures where the flag would introduce libatomic dependencies, it is silently omitted and behaviour is no worse than before this patch. Move the CFLAGS_GCOV block from its original position (before the arch Makefile include) to after the core KBUILD_CFLAGS assignments but before the scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins include. This placement ensures the try-run test sees arch-specific flags (-m32, -march=, -mno-outline-atomics) while avoiding GCC plugin flags (-fplugin=) that would break the test on clean builds when plugin shared objects do not yet exist. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260511105052.417187-2-khorenko@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko(a)virtuozzo.com> Tested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy(a)kernel.org> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux(a)weissschuh.net> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: Makefile [Fix ctx conflict.] Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- Makefile | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index e1e4ca4737a7..a378198425ec 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -675,16 +675,6 @@ endif # KBUILD_EXTMOD # Defaults to vmlinux, but the arch makefile usually adds further targets all: vmlinux -ifeq ($(CONFIG_PGO_KERNEL),y) -CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-generate -else -CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-arcs -endif -CFLAGS_GCOV += -ftest-coverage \ - $(call cc-option,-fno-tree-loop-im) \ - $(call cc-disable-warning,maybe-uninitialized,) -export CFLAGS_GCOV - # The arch Makefiles can override CC_FLAGS_FTRACE. We may also append it later. ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -pg @@ -988,6 +978,33 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types) # Require designated initializers for all marked structures KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Werror=designated-init) +ifeq ($(CONFIG_PGO_KERNEL),y) +CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-generate +else +CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-arcs +endif +CFLAGS_GCOV += -ftest-coverage \ + $(call cc-option,-fno-tree-loop-im) \ + $(call cc-disable-warning,maybe-uninitialized,) +ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC +# Use atomic counter updates to avoid concurrent-access crashes in GCOV. +# Only enable if -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic does not introduce new +# undefined symbols (e.g. libatomic calls that the kernel cannot link). +CFLAGS_GCOV += $(call try-run,\ + echo 'long long x; void f(void){x++;}' | \ + $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -w -fprofile-arcs \ + -ftest-coverage -x c - -c -o "$$TMP.base" && \ + echo 'long long x; void f(void){x++;}' | \ + $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -w -fprofile-arcs \ + -ftest-coverage -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic \ + -x c - -c -o "$$TMP" && \ + $(NM) "$$TMP.base" | grep ' U ' > "$$TMP.ubase" || true ; \ + $(NM) "$$TMP" | grep ' U ' > "$$TMP.utest" || true ; \ + cmp -s "$$TMP.ubase" "$$TMP.utest",\ + -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic) +endif +export CFLAGS_GCOV + # change __FILE__ to the relative path from the srctree KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer
by Pu Lehui 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng(a)seu.edu.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.144 commit 81fc9a13acae99966232f0e055eb2e445263b89a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16139 CVE: CVE-2026-63809 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream. proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory. Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc allocations. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc5. Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1 check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to /proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30 __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30 ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870 ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480 ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ... </TASK> With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports. Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil(a)etsalapatis.com> Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng(a)seu.edu.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index c2403457d4b2..eed820793ea7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -1802,7 +1802,7 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(struct ctl_table_header *head, kfree(ctx.cur_val); if (ret == 1 && ctx.new_updated) { - kfree(*buf); + kvfree(*buf); *buf = ctx.new_val; *pcount = ctx.new_len; } else { -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-53133
by Xia Fukun 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

CVE-2026-53133 patch Jason Gunthorpe (1): RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G Leon Romanovsky (1): RDMA: Move DMA block iterator logic into dedicated files drivers/infiniband/core/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c | 43 ++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c | 38 --------- drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_res.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_alloc.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_dca.c | 1 + drivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/main.h | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mana_ib.h | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/mr.c | 1 + drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mem.c | 1 + drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/umr.c | 1 + drivers/infiniband/hw/mthca/mthca_provider.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/ocrdma/ocrdma_verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/qedr/verbs.c | 2 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/vmw_pvrdma/pvrdma.h | 2 +- include/rdma/ib_umem.h | 32 ------- include/rdma/ib_verbs.h | 48 ----------- include/rdma/iter.h | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++ 21 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/infiniband/core/iter.c create mode 100644 include/rdma/iter.h -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 25 Jul '26

25 Jul '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 CVE: CVE-2025-27558 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: net/wireless/util.c [contxt Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..4af280c1a6d4 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

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