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[PATCH 0/3] *** CVE-2026-53358 ***
by Chen Jinghuang 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Marco Elver (1): Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref Siwei Zhang (2): Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen() Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 16 +++++++++------- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 5def57966807..9c5ff45bfd6b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -216,7 +216,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -237,6 +239,16 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -282,6 +294,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 513360234b14..c2e0b7c9562e 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -219,7 +219,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -240,6 +242,16 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -285,6 +297,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 6682b8ab11f1..bc53ea82161d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; struct buffer_head *bh = NULL; struct fscrypt_str fstr = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + bool has_csum = ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb); err = fscrypt_prepare_readdir(inode); if (err) @@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) return err; /* Can we just clear INDEX flag to ignore htree information? */ - if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) { + if (!has_csum) { /* * We don't set the inode dirty flag since it's not * critical that it gets flushed back to the disk. @@ -233,7 +234,10 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -255,6 +259,17 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -310,6 +325,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator
by Wupeng Ma 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 5f56bc6bddffe8710ba0ba8844023b5a44ca90e4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16031 CVE: CVE-2026-53150 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit cff8eb65d1eafe7793e54b4d0cf6bf831644630b upstream. tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic: property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0'; When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to the allocation. Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no valid representation in the XDomain property protocol. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c index dc555cda98e68..bf750bee23694 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ static bool tb_property_entry_valid(const struct tb_property_entry *entry, case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY: case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DATA: case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_TEXT: + if (!entry->length) + return false; if (entry->length > block_len) return false; if (entry->value + entry->length > block_len) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sctp: purge outqueue on stale COOKIE-ECHO handling
by Wupeng Ma 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 2afc9e684dc7fecf73db1edc937ebbc47b4b68dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15640 CVE: CVE-2026-52924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e374b22e9b07b72a25909621464ff74096151bfb ] sctp_stream_update() is only invoked when the association is moved into COOKIE_WAIT during association setup/reconfiguration. In this path, the outbound stream scheduler state (stream->out_curr) is expected to be clean, since no user data should have been transmitted yet unless the state machine has already partially progressed. However, a corner case exists in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(): when a Stale Cookie ERROR is received, the association is rolled back from COOKIE_ECHOED to COOKIE_WAIT. In this scenario, user data may already have been queued and even bundled with the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. During the rollback, sctp_stream_update() frees the old stream table and installs a new one, but it does not invalidate stream->out_curr. As a result, out_curr may still point to a freed sctp_stream_out entry from the previous stream state. Later, SCTP scheduler dequeue paths (FCFS, RR, PRIO, etc.) rely on stream->out_curr->ext, which can lead to use-after-free once the old stream state has been released via sctp_stream_free(). This results in crashes such as (reported by Yuqi): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100004d4d3208 by task mini_poc/9312 CPU: 1 UID: 1001 PID: 9312 Comm: mini_poc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-00305-gbd3a4795d574 #5 PREEMPT(full) sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140 sctp_outq_flush+0x1603/0x33e0 sctp_do_sm+0x31c9/0x5d30 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x392/0x6f0 sctp_inq_push+0x1db/0x270 sctp_rcv+0x138d/0x3c10 Fix this by fully purging the association outqueue when handling the Stale Cookie case. This ensures all pending transmit and retransmit state is dropped, and any scheduler cached pointers are invalidated, making it safe to rebuild stream state during COOKIE_WAIT restart. Updating only stream->out_curr would be insufficient, since queued and retransmittable data would still reference the old stream state and trigger later use-after-free in dequeue paths. Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations") Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird(a)lzu.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyq21(a)lenovo.com> Reported-by: Ren Wei <n05ec(a)lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/94318159b9052907a6cbb7256aee8b5f8dfbfccb.178051030… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 5e9449b0c7907..583d83dcb8426 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -2597,11 +2597,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale( */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY, SCTP_NULL()); - /* If we've sent any data bundled with COOKIE-ECHO we will need to - * resend - */ - sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN, - SCTP_TRANSPORT(asoc->peer.primary_path)); + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PURGE_OUTQUEUE, SCTP_NULL()); /* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just * rerun it through as a sideffect. -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] gtp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()
by Wupeng Ma 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: David Carlier <devnexen(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.88 commit 0e550caa4bf575a06417de1e2b03a25f2caf88b6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15772 CVE: CVE-2026-53070 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 5638504a2aa9e1b9d72af9060df1a160cce2d379 ] gtp_genl_send_echo_req() runs as a generic netlink doit handler in process context with BH not disabled. It calls udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(), which eventually invokes iptunnel_xmit() — that uses __this_cpu_inc/dec on softnet_data.xmit.recursion to track the tunnel xmit recursion level. Without local_bh_disable(), the task may migrate between dev_xmit_recursion_inc() and dev_xmit_recursion_dec(), breaking the per-CPU counter pairing. The result is stale or negative recursion levels that can later produce false-positive SKB_DROP_REASON_RECURSION_LIMIT drops on either CPU. The other udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call sites in gtp.c are unaffected: the data path runs under ndo_start_xmit and the echo response handlers run from the UDP encap rx softirq, both with BH already disabled. Fix it by disabling BH around the udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call, mirroring commit 2cd7e6971fc2 ("sctp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()"). Fixes: 6f1a9140ecda ("net: add xmit recursion limit to tunnel xmit functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Carlier <devnexen(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260417055408.4667-1-devnexen@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> [ Context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/gtp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c index 3684044547dc6..c6fe44be47d9f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/gtp.c +++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c @@ -1809,6 +1809,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_send_echo_req(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) return -ENODEV; } + local_bh_disable(); udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(rt, sk, skb_to_send, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, fl4.flowi4_tos, @@ -1818,6 +1819,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_send_echo_req(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) !net_eq(sock_net(sk), dev_net(gtp->dev)), false); + local_bh_enable(); return 0; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Avoid NULL dereference in dc_dmub_srv error paths
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 4ae3e16f4b3bf64140f773629b765d605ee079a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16001 CVE: CVE-2026-53313 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() and dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(). Both functions check: if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) and then call DC_LOG_ERROR() inside that block. DC_LOG_ERROR() uses dc_dmub_srv->ctx internally. So if dc_dmub_srv is NULL, the logging itself can dereference a NULL pointer and cause a crash. Fix this by splitting the checks. First check if dc_dmub_srv is NULL and return immediately. Then check dc_dmub_srv->dmub and log the error only when dc_dmub_srv is valid. Fixes the below: ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:962 dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 961) ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:1167 dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 1166) Fixes: 2631ac1ac328 ("drm/amd/display: add DMUB registers to crash dump diagnostic data.") Fixes: 71ba6b577a35 ("drm/amd/display: Add interface to enable DPIA trace") Cc: Roman Li <roman.li(a)amd.com> Cc: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Cc: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c index 8344957d7449..a579366e7698 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c @@ -796,7 +796,10 @@ void dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data(struct dc_dmub_srv *dc_dmub_srv) { struct dmub_diagnostic_data diag_data = {0}; - if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { + if (!dc_dmub_srv) + return; + + if (!dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { DC_LOG_ERROR("%s: invalid parameters.", __func__); return; } @@ -1037,7 +1040,10 @@ void dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(const struct dc *dc) enum dmub_status status; static const uint32_t timeout_us = 30; - if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { + if (!dc_dmub_srv) + return; + + if (!dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { DC_LOG_ERROR("%s: invalid parameters.", __func__); return; } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit 40a25d59e85b3c8709ac2424d44f65610467871e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15848 CVE: CVE-2026-53163 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f] class_raw_spinlock_constructor remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561 rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120 futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0 __x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0 task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection, leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal. Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter() upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2e2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() (where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to account for try_to_take_rt_mutex(). Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") Reported-by: syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69f114ac.050a0220.ac8b.0003.GAE@google.com/ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507112913.1019537-1-dave@stgolabs.net Conflicts: kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 3 +++ kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index def1f8fbc85c..6df2f674712a 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -1524,6 +1524,9 @@ static void __sched remove_waiter(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock); + if (!waiter_task) /* never enqueued */ + return; + scoped_guard(raw_spinlock, &waiter_task->pi_lock) { rt_mutex_dequeue(lock, waiter); waiter_task->pi_blocked_on = NULL; diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c index d0433287effd..74b24ecdbeea 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int __sched rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task); - if (unlikely(ret)) + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) remove_waiter(lock, waiter); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit 40a25d59e85b3c8709ac2424d44f65610467871e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15848 CVE: CVE-2026-53163 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f] class_raw_spinlock_constructor remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561 rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120 futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0 __x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0 task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection, leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal. Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter() upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2e2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() (where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to account for try_to_take_rt_mutex(). Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") Reported-by: syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69f114ac.050a0220.ac8b.0003.GAE@google.com/ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507112913.1019537-1-dave@stgolabs.net Conflicts: kernel/locking/rtmutex.c kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index 109a9e21b4e1..fb41115bfa99 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -1113,6 +1113,9 @@ static void remove_waiter(struct rt_mutex *lock, lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock); + if (!waiter_task) /* never enqueued */ + return; + raw_spin_lock(&waiter_task->pi_lock); rt_mutex_dequeue(lock, waiter); waiter_task->pi_blocked_on = NULL; @@ -1842,7 +1845,7 @@ int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock, raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task); - if (unlikely(ret)) + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) remove_waiter(lock, waiter); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); -- 2.34.1

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