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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-23296
by Li Lingfeng 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Junxiao Bi (2): scsi: core: Fix refcount leak for tagset_refcnt scsi: core: Fix error handling for scsi_alloc_sdev() drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/ICTWCN Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..dcca1b882455 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&hdr.eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c [add type casting in check_sub_overflow()] Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index b37aada92a62a..5d51794b69d46 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct ib_ah *ah; struct ib_rmpp_mad *rmpp_mad; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -557,7 +558,11 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, (size_t) (hdr_size(file) + hdr_len), + &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c [add type casting in check_sub_overflow()] Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index b37aada92a62a..5d51794b69d46 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct ib_ah *ah; struct ib_rmpp_mad *rmpp_mad; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -557,7 +558,11 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, (size_t) (hdr_size(file) + hdr_len), + &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_ext_shift_extents()
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit ca81109d4a8f192dc1cbad4a1ee25246363c2833 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In ext4_ext_shift_extents(), if the extent is NULL in the while loop, the function returns immediately without releasing the path obtained via ext4_find_extent(), leading to a memory leak. Fix this by jumping to the out label to ensure the path is properly released. Fixes: a18ed359bdddc ("ext4: always check ext4_ext_find_extent result") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251225084800.905701-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index ceca82a0fd5c..786701524736 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -5278,7 +5278,8 @@ ext4_ext_shift_extents(struct inode *inode, handle_t *handle, if (!extent) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "unexpected hole at %lu", (unsigned long) *iterator); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out; } if (SHIFT == SHIFT_LEFT && *iterator > le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block)) { -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] quota: fix livelock between quotactl and freeze_super
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Abhishek Bapat <abhishekbapat(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 77449e453dfc006ad738dec55374c4cbc056fd39 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a filesystem is frozen, quotactl_block() enters a retry loop waiting for the filesystem to thaw. It acquires s_umount, checks the freeze state, drops s_umount and uses sb_start_write() - sb_end_write() pair to wait for the unfreeze. However, this retry loop can trigger a livelock issue, specifically on kernels with preemption disabled. The mechanism is as follows: 1. freeze_super() sets SB_FREEZE_WRITE and calls sb_wait_write(). 2. sb_wait_write() calls percpu_down_write(), which initiates synchronize_rcu(). 3. Simultaneously, quotactl_block() spins in its retry loop, immediately executing the sb_start_write() - sb_end_write() pair. 4. Because the kernel is non-preemptible and the loop contains no scheduling points, quotactl_block() never yields the CPU. This prevents that CPU from reaching an RCU quiescent state. 5. synchronize_rcu() in the freezer thread waits indefinitely for the quotactl_block() CPU to report a quiescent state. 6. quotactl_block() spins indefinitely waiting for the freezer to advance, which it cannot do as it is blocked on the RCU sync. This results in a hang of the freezer process and 100% CPU usage by the quota process. While this can occur intermittently on multi-core systems, it is reliably reproducing on a node with the following script, running both the freezer and the quota toggle on the same CPU: # mkfs.ext4 -O quota /dev/sda 2g && mkdir a_mount # mount /dev/sda -o quota,usrquota,grpquota a_mount # taskset -c 3 bash -c "while true; do xfs_freeze -f a_mount; \ xfs_freeze -u a_mount; done" & # taskset -c 3 bash -c "while true; do quotaon a_mount; \ quotaoff a_mount; done" & Adding cond_resched() to the retry loop fixes the issue. It acts as an RCU quiescent state, allowing synchronize_rcu() in percpu_down_write() to complete. Fixes: 576215cffdef ("fs: Drop wait_unfrozen wait queue") Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bapat <abhishekbapat(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260115213103.1089129-1-abhishekbapat@google.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/quota/quota.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/quota/quota.c b/fs/quota/quota.c index 0e41fb84060f..5be53cae2c95 100644 --- a/fs/quota/quota.c +++ b/fs/quota/quota.c @@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ static struct super_block *quotactl_block(const char __user *special, int cmd) sb_start_write(sb); sb_end_write(sb); put_super(sb); + cond_resched(); goto retry; } return sb; -- 2.39.2

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