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[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm/slub: avoid accessing metadata when pointer is invalid in object_err()
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Li Qiong <liqiong(a)nfschina.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.243 commit f66012909e7bf383fcdc5850709ed5716073fdc4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8393 CVE: CVE-2025-39902 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b4efccec8d06ceb10a7d34d7b1c449c569d53770 ] object_err() reports details of an object for further debugging, such as the freelist pointer, redzone, etc. However, if the pointer is invalid, attempting to access object metadata can lead to a crash since it does not point to a valid object. One known path to the crash is when alloc_consistency_checks() determines the pointer to the allocated object is invalid because of a freelist corruption, and calls object_err() to report it. The debug code should report and handle the corruption gracefully and not crash in the process. In case the pointer is NULL or check_valid_pointer() returns false for the pointer, only print the pointer value and skip accessing metadata. Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Qiong <liqiong(a)nfschina.com> Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> [ struct page + print_page_info() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- mm/slub.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index bcc00a95c368..88024a7ebeb0 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -751,11 +751,16 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p) void object_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *object, char *reason) { slab_bug(s, "%s", reason); - print_trailer(s, page, object); + if (!object || !check_valid_pointer(s, page, object)) { + print_page_info(page); + pr_err("Invalid pointer 0x%p\n", object); + } else { + print_trailer(s, page, object); + } } static __printf(3, 4) void slab_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, const char *fmt, ...) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] scsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.241 commit ad8a9d38d30c691a77c456e72b78f7932d4f234d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9005 CVE: CVE-2025-39676 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9dcf111dd3e7ed5fce82bb108e3a3fc001c07225 ] The qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error, but qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error pointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers to NULL. Fixes: 13483730a13b ("[SCSI] qla4xxx: fix flash/ddb support") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aJwnVKS9tHsw1tEu@stanley.mountain Reviewed-by: Chris Leech <cleech(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Mingrui <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c index 15146e8be675..23bdd21ccc83 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c @@ -6614,10 +6614,12 @@ static struct iscsi_endpoint *qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, addr->sin_port = htons(le16_to_cpu(fw_ddb_entry->port)); } ep = qla4xxx_ep_connect(ha->host, (struct sockaddr *)dst_addr, 0); vfree(dst_addr); + if (IS_ERR(ep)) + return NULL; return ep; } static int qla4xxx_verify_boot_idx(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, uint16_t idx) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: drop unnecessary user-triggerable WARN_ONCE in verifierl log
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.1.107 commit 40c88c429a598006f91ad7a2b89856cd50b3a008 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13001 CVE: CVE-2023-54145 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit cff36398bd4c7d322d424433db437f3c3391c491 ] It's trivial for user to trigger "verifier log line truncated" warning, as verifier has a fixed-sized buffer of 1024 bytes (as of now), and there are at least two pieces of user-provided information that can be output through this buffer, and both can be arbitrarily sized by user: - BTF names; - BTF.ext source code lines strings. Verifier log buffer should be properly sized for typical verifier state output. But it's sort-of expected that this buffer won't be long enough in some circumstances. So let's drop the check. In any case code will work correctly, at worst truncating a part of a single line output. Reported-by: syzbot+8b2a08dfbd25fd933d75(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230516180409.3549088-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c kernel/bpf/log.c [Conflicts due to not merge 4294a0a7ab62 ("bpf: Split off basic BPF verifier log into separate file")] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 13849004ae38..fe05d95569d8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -273,13 +273,10 @@ void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt, { unsigned int n; n = vscnprintf(log->kbuf, BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE, fmt, args); - WARN_ONCE(n >= BPF_VERIFIER_TMP_LOG_SIZE - 1, - "verifier log line truncated - local buffer too short\n"); - n = min(log->len_total - log->len_used - 1, n); log->kbuf[n] = '\0'; if (log->level == BPF_LOG_KERNEL) { pr_err("BPF:%s\n", log->kbuf); -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/vmalloc: fix data race in show_numa_info()
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 5c5f0468d172ddec2e333d738d2a1f85402cf0bc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9408 CVE: CVE-2025-38383 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The following data-race was found in show_numa_info(): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vmalloc_info_show / vmalloc_info_show read to 0xffff88800971fe30 of 4 bytes by task 8289 on cpu 0: show_numa_info mm/vmalloc.c:4936 [inline] vmalloc_info_show+0x5a8/0x7e0 mm/vmalloc.c:5016 seq_read_iter+0x373/0xb40 fs/seq_file.c:230 proc_reg_read_iter+0x11e/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:299 .... write to 0xffff88800971fe30 of 4 bytes by task 8287 on cpu 1: show_numa_info mm/vmalloc.c:4934 [inline] vmalloc_info_show+0x38f/0x7e0 mm/vmalloc.c:5016 seq_read_iter+0x373/0xb40 fs/seq_file.c:230 proc_reg_read_iter+0x11e/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:299 .... value changed: 0x0000008f -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== According to this report,there is a read/write data-race because m->private is accessible to multiple CPUs. To fix this, instead of allocating the heap in proc_vmalloc_init() and passing the heap address to m->private, vmalloc_info_show() should allocate the heap. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250508165620.15321-1-aha310510@gmail.com Fixes: 8e1d743f2c26 ("mm: vmalloc: support multiple nodes in vmallocinfo") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: mm/vmalloc.c [conflicts due to merge 8e63c98d86f61 ("mm: vmalloc: support multiple nodes in vmallocinfo")] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- mm/vmalloc.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index 375b0782353f..1455393eec23 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -3094,11 +3094,11 @@ void __init vm_area_register_early(struct vm_struct *vm, size_t align) static void clear_vm_uninitialized_flag(struct vm_struct *vm) { /* * Before removing VM_UNINITIALIZED, * we should make sure that vm has proper values. - * Pair with smp_rmb() in show_numa_info(). + * Pair with smp_rmb() in vread_iter() and vmalloc_info_show(). */ smp_wmb(); vm->flags &= ~VM_UNINITIALIZED; } @@ -5049,32 +5049,33 @@ int remap_vmalloc_hugepage_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *addr, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(remap_vmalloc_hugepage_range); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -static void show_numa_info(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_struct *v) -{ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) { - unsigned int nr, *counters = m->private; - unsigned int step = 1U << vm_area_page_order(v); - if (!counters) - return; +/* + * Print number of pages allocated on each memory node. + * + * This function can only be called if CONFIG_NUMA is enabled + * and VM_UNINITIALIZED bit in v->flags is disabled. + */ +static void show_numa_info(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_struct *v, + unsigned int *counters) +{ + unsigned int nr; + unsigned int step = 1U << vm_area_page_order(v); - if (v->flags & VM_UNINITIALIZED) - return; - /* Pair with smp_wmb() in clear_vm_uninitialized_flag() */ - smp_rmb(); + if (!counters) + return; - memset(counters, 0, nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int)); + memset(counters, 0, nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int)); - for (nr = 0; nr < v->nr_pages; nr += step) - counters[page_to_nid(v->pages[nr])] += step; - for_each_node_state(nr, N_HIGH_MEMORY) - if (counters[nr]) - seq_printf(m, " N%u=%u", nr, counters[nr]); - } + for (nr = 0; nr < v->nr_pages; nr += step) + counters[page_to_nid(v->pages[nr])] += step; + for_each_node_state(nr, N_HIGH_MEMORY) + if (counters[nr]) + seq_printf(m, " N%u=%u", nr, counters[nr]); } static void show_purge_info(struct seq_file *m) { struct vmap_node *vn; @@ -5098,10 +5099,14 @@ static int vmalloc_info_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p) { struct vmap_node *vn; struct vmap_area *va; struct vm_struct *v; int i; + unsigned int *counters; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + counters = kmalloc(nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL); for (i = 0; i < nr_vmap_nodes; i++) { vn = &vmap_nodes[i]; spin_lock(&vn->busy.lock); @@ -5114,10 +5119,15 @@ static int vmalloc_info_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p) continue; } v = va->vm; + if (v->flags & VM_UNINITIALIZED) + continue; + + /* Pair with smp_wmb() in clear_vm_uninitialized_flag() */ + smp_rmb(); seq_printf(m, "0x%pK-0x%pK %7ld", v->addr, v->addr + v->size, v->size); if (v->caller) @@ -5148,33 +5158,30 @@ static int vmalloc_info_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p) seq_puts(m, " dma-coherent"); if (is_vmalloc_addr(v->pages)) seq_puts(m, " vpages"); - show_numa_info(m, v); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + show_numa_info(m, v, counters); + seq_putc(m, '\n'); } spin_unlock(&vn->busy.lock); } /* * As a final step, dump "unpurged" areas. */ show_purge_info(m); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + kfree(counters); return 0; } static int __init proc_vmalloc_init(void) { - void *priv_data = NULL; - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) - priv_data = kmalloc(nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL); - - proc_create_single_data("vmallocinfo", - 0400, NULL, vmalloc_info_show, priv_data); - + proc_create_single("vmallocinfo", 0400, NULL, vmalloc_info_show); return 0; } module_init(proc_vmalloc_init); #endif -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit f5ad0819f902b4b33591791b92a0350fb3692a6b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9005 CVE: CVE-2025-39676 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9dcf111dd3e7ed5fce82bb108e3a3fc001c07225 ] The qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error, but qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error pointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers to NULL. Fixes: 13483730a13b ("[SCSI] qla4xxx: fix flash/ddb support") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aJwnVKS9tHsw1tEu@stanley.mountain Reviewed-by: Chris Leech <cleech(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c index 675332e49a7b..4cbeeaab63d7 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c @@ -6602,10 +6602,12 @@ static struct iscsi_endpoint *qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, addr->sin_port = htons(le16_to_cpu(fw_ddb_entry->port)); } ep = qla4xxx_ep_connect(ha->host, (struct sockaddr *)dst_addr, 0); vfree(dst_addr); + if (IS_ERR(ep)) + return NULL; return ep; } static int qla4xxx_verify_boot_idx(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, uint16_t idx) { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/slub: avoid accessing metadata when pointer is invalid in object_err()
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Li Qiong <liqiong(a)nfschina.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.105 commit 0ef7058b4dc6fcef622ac23b45225db57f17b83f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8393 CVE: CVE-2025-39902 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b4efccec8d06ceb10a7d34d7b1c449c569d53770 ] object_err() reports details of an object for further debugging, such as the freelist pointer, redzone, etc. However, if the pointer is invalid, attempting to access object metadata can lead to a crash since it does not point to a valid object. One known path to the crash is when alloc_consistency_checks() determines the pointer to the allocated object is invalid because of a freelist corruption, and calls object_err() to report it. The debug code should report and handle the corruption gracefully and not crash in the process. In case the pointer is NULL or check_valid_pointer() returns false for the pointer, only print the pointer value and skip accessing metadata. Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Qiong <liqiong(a)nfschina.com> Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- mm/slub.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 25516a5cbf04..fc1636d1be03 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -1001,11 +1001,16 @@ static void object_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, { if (slab_add_kunit_errors()) return; slab_bug(s, "%s", reason); - print_trailer(s, slab, object); + if (!object || !check_valid_pointer(s, slab, object)) { + print_slab_info(slab); + pr_err("Invalid pointer 0x%p\n", object); + } else { + print_trailer(s, slab, object); + } add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static bool freelist_corrupted(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void **freelist, void *nextfree) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + include/linux/cpu.h | 1 + 12 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Pierre-Eric Pelloux-Prayer <pierre-eric.pelloux-prayer(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 70150b9443dddf02157d821c68abf438f55a2e8e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11434 CVE: CVE-2025-40329 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 487df8b698345dd5a91346335f05170ed5f29d4e upstream. The Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock: [ 1231.611031] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 1231.611033] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1231.611034] ---- ---- [ 1231.611035] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611038] local_irq_disable(); [ 1231.611039] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611041] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611044] <Interrupt> [ 1231.611045] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611047] *** DEADLOCK *** In this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job->dependencies through the xa_* functions that don't disable interrupts (eg: drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()). CPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling callback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to grab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0. Replacing all xa_* usage by their xa_*_irq counterparts would fix this issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal takes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback. dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock -> drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() -> foreach dependencies -> dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock This will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock. To fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them is moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.2+ Fixes: 2fdb8a8f07c2 ("drm/scheduler: rework entity flush, kill and fini") Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/13908 Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Eric Pelloux-Prayer <pierre-eric.pelloux-prayer(a)amd.com> [phasta: commit message nits] Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104095358.15092-1-pierre-eric.pelloux-prayer@… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c | 34 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c index eed3b8bed9e4..01de4f072b68 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c @@ -161,30 +161,19 @@ int drm_sched_entity_error(struct drm_sched_entity *entity) return r; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_error); +static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, + struct dma_fence_cb *cb); + static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work(struct work_struct *wrk) { struct drm_sched_job *job = container_of(wrk, typeof(*job), work); - - drm_sched_fence_scheduled(job->s_fence, NULL); - drm_sched_fence_finished(job->s_fence, -ESRCH); - WARN_ON(job->s_fence->parent); - job->sched->ops->free_job(job); -} - -/* Signal the scheduler finished fence when the entity in question is killed. */ -static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, - struct dma_fence_cb *cb) -{ - struct drm_sched_job *job = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_job, - finish_cb); + struct dma_fence *f; unsigned long index; - dma_fence_put(f); - /* Wait for all dependencies to avoid data corruptions */ xa_for_each(&job->dependencies, index, f) { struct drm_sched_fence *s_fence = to_drm_sched_fence(f); if (s_fence && f == &s_fence->scheduled) { @@ -208,10 +197,25 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, return; dma_fence_put(f); } + drm_sched_fence_scheduled(job->s_fence, NULL); + drm_sched_fence_finished(job->s_fence, -ESRCH); + WARN_ON(job->s_fence->parent); + job->sched->ops->free_job(job); +} + +/* Signal the scheduler finished fence when the entity in question is killed. */ +static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, + struct dma_fence_cb *cb) +{ + struct drm_sched_job *job = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_job, + finish_cb); + + dma_fence_put(f); + INIT_WORK(&job->work, drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work); schedule_work(&job->work); } /* Remove the entity from the scheduler and kill all pending jobs */ -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] parse_longname(): strrchr() expects NUL-terminated string
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.42 commit bb80f7618832d26f7e395f52f82b1dac76223e5f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9111 CVE: CVE-2025-38660 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit 101841c38346f4ca41dc1802c867da990ffb32eb ] ... and parse_longname() is not guaranteed that. That's the reason why it uses kmemdup_nul() to build the argument for kstrtou64(); the problem is, kstrtou64() is not the only thing that need it. Just get a NUL-terminated copy of the entire thing and be done with that... Fixes: dd66df0053ef ("ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names") Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 08c385610731..fa2aaf1d30f8 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -213,35 +213,31 @@ static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, { struct inode *dir = NULL; struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP }; - char *inode_number; - char *name_end; - int orig_len = *name_len; + char *name_end, *inode_number; int ret = -EIO; - + /* NUL-terminate */ + char *str __free(kfree) = kmemdup_nul(name, *name_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!str) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); /* Skip initial '_' */ - name++; - name_end = strrchr(name, '_'); + str++; + name_end = strrchr(str, '_'); if (!name_end) { - dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name); + dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", str); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } - *name_len = (name_end - name); + *name_len = (name_end - str); if (*name_len <= 0) { pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n"); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } /* Get the inode number */ - inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1, - orig_len - *name_len - 2, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!inode_number) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + inode_number = name_end + 1; ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 10, &vino.ino); if (ret) { - dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name); - dir = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto out; + dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", str); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } /* And finally the inode */ @@ -252,9 +248,6 @@ static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, if (IS_ERR(dir)) dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name); } - -out: - kfree(inode_number); return dir; } -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: imon: make send_packet() more robust
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 8231e80118463be5598daaf266c1c83650f1948b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11614 CVE: CVE-2025-68194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit eecd203ada43a4693ce6fdd3a58ae10c7819252c ] syzbot is reporting that imon has three problems which result in hung tasks due to forever holding device lock [1]. First problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() once got -EPROTO error after ictx->dev_present_intf0 became true, usb_rx_callback_intf0() resubmits urb after printk(), and resubmitted urb causes usb_rx_callback_intf0() to again get -EPROTO error. This results in printk() flooding (RCU stalls). Alan Stern commented [2] that In theory it's okay to resubmit _if_ the driver has a robust error-recovery scheme (such as giving up after some fixed limit on the number of errors or after some fixed time has elapsed, perhaps with a time delay to prevent a flood of errors). Most drivers don't bother to do this; they simply give up right away. This makes them more vulnerable to short-term noise interference during USB transfers, but in reality such interference is quite rare. There's nothing really wrong with giving up right away. but imon has a poor error-recovery scheme which just retries forever; this behavior should be fixed. Since I'm not sure whether it is safe for imon users to give up upon any error code, this patch takes care of only union of error codes chosen from modules in drivers/media/rc/ directory which handle -EPROTO error (i.e. ir_toy, mceusb and igorplugusb). Second problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() once got -EPROTO error before ictx->dev_present_intf0 becomes true, usb_rx_callback_intf0() always resubmits urb due to commit 8791d63af0cf ("[media] imon: don't wedge hardware after early callbacks"). Move the ictx->dev_present_intf0 test introduced by commit 6f6b90c9231a ("[media] imon: don't parse scancodes until intf configured") to immediately before imon_incoming_packet(), or the first problem explained above happens without printk() flooding (i.e. hung task). Third problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() is not called for some reason (e.g. flaky hardware; the reproducer for this problem sometimes prevents usb_rx_callback_intf0() from being called), wait_for_completion_interruptible() in send_packet() never returns (i.e. hung task). As a workaround for such situation, change send_packet() to wait for completion with timeout of 10 seconds. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=592e2ab8775dbe0bf09a [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d6da6709-d799-4be3-a695-850bddd6eb24@rowland.harv… [2] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean(a)mess.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/rc/imon.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c index f4deca8894e0..bb4aabb08c06 100644 --- a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c @@ -650,12 +650,15 @@ static int send_packet(struct imon_context *ictx) smp_rmb(); /* ensure later readers know we're not busy */ pr_err_ratelimited("error submitting urb(%d)\n", retval); } else { - /* Wait for transmission to complete (or abort) */ - retval = wait_for_completion_interruptible( - &ictx->tx.finished); - if (retval) { + /* Wait for transmission to complete (or abort or timeout) */ + retval = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&ictx->tx.finished, 10 * HZ); + if (retval <= 0) { usb_kill_urb(ictx->tx_urb); pr_err_ratelimited("task interrupted\n"); + if (retval < 0) + ictx->tx.status = retval; + else + ictx->tx.status = -ETIMEDOUT; } ictx->tx.busy = false; @@ -1754,14 +1757,6 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf0(struct urb *urb) if (!ictx) return; - /* - * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we - * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we - * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware - */ - if (!ictx->dev_present_intf0) - goto out; - switch (urb->status) { case -ENOENT: /* usbcore unlink successful! */ return; @@ -1770,16 +1765,29 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf0(struct urb *urb) break; case 0: - imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); + /* + * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we + * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we + * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware + */ + if (ictx->dev_present_intf0) + imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); break; + case -ECONNRESET: + case -EILSEQ: + case -EPROTO: + case -EPIPE: + dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d)\n", + __func__, urb->status); + return; + default: dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d): ignored\n", __func__, urb->status); break; } -out: usb_submit_urb(ictx->rx_urb_intf0, GFP_ATOMIC); } @@ -1795,14 +1803,6 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf1(struct urb *urb) if (!ictx) return; - /* - * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we - * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we - * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware - */ - if (!ictx->dev_present_intf1) - goto out; - switch (urb->status) { case -ENOENT: /* usbcore unlink successful! */ return; @@ -1811,16 +1811,29 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf1(struct urb *urb) break; case 0: - imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); + /* + * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we + * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we + * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware + */ + if (ictx->dev_present_intf1) + imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); break; + case -ECONNRESET: + case -EILSEQ: + case -EPROTO: + case -EPIPE: + dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d)\n", + __func__, urb->status); + return; + default: dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d): ignored\n", __func__, urb->status); break; } -out: usb_submit_urb(ictx->rx_urb_intf1, GFP_ATOMIC); } -- 2.43.0

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